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The authors have analyzed organizations of the performing arts sector, one of the classic key benefits in the economy. The 
empirical research has been based on the economic pattern of “cost disease”. A unique statistical database has been compiled on 
the basis of the information database of the Federal State Statistics Service and the Ministry of culture of the Russian Federation. 
The research presents the Baumol’s indices calculations updated in 2001–2015. There have been confirmed such symptoms of 
Baumol’s cost disease as: labor productivity in cultural organizations lagging behind the average regional rate, super-inflationary 
growth for ticket prices in theaters, and catch-up wage growth in the theater in relation to the average wage level in the region. 
The author’s approach to the analysis of the Baumol’s cost disease is a modification of the overall Baumol index as a replacement 
for the income deficit indicator for the share of expenses covered by budget funds. New results have been obtained for estimating 
the income deficit and the share of expenditures covered by public funding by using the panel data model and quantile regression. 
The practical value of this research is the systematization of budgetary and extra-budgetary support for cultural organizations. 
New institutions of financial support such as the institute of participatory budgeting and the institution of individual budget 
allocations have been suggested to create favorable environment for the development of cultural organizations
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Авторы анализируют функционирование учреждений сферы культуры и искусства, которая является одним из клас-
сических примеров опекаемых благ в экономике. Эмпирическое исследование опирается на экономическую зако-
номерность «болезнь цен». Составлена уникальная статистическая база данных на основе информации Росстата 
и информационной базы данных Министерства культуры РФ. В исследовании обновлены расчеты индексов Баумоля 
за период 2001–2015 гг. Получено подтверждение наличия таких симптомов «болезни Баумоля», как: отстающая от 
среднерегионального темпа производительность труда в учреждениях культуры, сверхинфляционный рост цен на би-
леты в театрах, догоняющий рост заработных плат в театре по отношению к среднему уровню заработных плат в ре-
гионе. Авторским подходом к анализу «болезни цен» Баумоля можно считать модификацию общего индекса Баумоля 
в виде замены показателя дефицита дохода на долю расходов, покрываемых за счет бюджетных средств. Получены 
новые результаты оценки дефицита дохода и доли расходов, покрываемых за счет государственного финансирования, 
с использованием модели панельных данных и квантильной регрессии. Практическая ценность данного исследования 
состоит в систематизации механизмов бюджетной и внебюджетной поддержки учреждений искусств. В качестве осно-
вы для создания благоприятной среды развития организаций культуры предложены такие новые институты финансо-
вой поддержки, как институт партисипативного бюджетирования и институт индивидуальных бюджетных назначений.
Ключевые слова: учреждения культуры; отстающая производительность труда; дефицит доходов; модель «болезни 
цен»; заработная плата; финансовые институты; бюджетная субсидия
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INtRODUCtION: thE thEOREtICal 
laNDSCaPE
After the crises of the 1990s, the social sector of the 
Russian economy in the new century has been influ-
enced by the dominant idea to reduce it both in finance 
and in labor force. It has a particularly negative impact 
on its humanitarian component. Increasing “financial 
starvation” of institutions of education, health, science 
and culture has negative impact on personnel policy 
and on the quality of goods produced [1].
This situation is best seen in the performing arts 
sector in some countries. Many researchers point to 
great difficulties in fulfilling the obligations of cultural 
institutions in covering their expenses that combined 
with the rise in public spending on culture and de-
pendence on budget financing [2]. At the same time, 
the managers of these organizations have to look for 
alternative ways to achieve a positive economic effect, 
as they have limited tools to increase productivity. 
They have no real opportunity to significantly increase 
production of goods by improving the qualification of 
employees, production process or increasing its scale. 
Such phenomenon is called the effect of Baumol’s 
cost disease.
The specificity of production of goods, subjected 
to the effect of cost disease, is that labor productivity 
in the performing arts can’t grow without reducing 
the quality of products and objectively lags behind 
the growth of labor productivity in the economy as 
a whole [3]. This mechanism entails a rapid increase 
of the production costs of cultural goods relative to 
the increase in the price of the final product. The 
consequence of this economic effect, confirmed by 
empirical studies [4–8] is an objective unprofitability 
of cultural organizations. However, in some sources 
[9], the authors suggest that such mechanisms of 
economic modeling and productivity optimization as 
marketing and management, as well as the develop-
ment and creation of a new paradigm of culture can 
overcome the “disease of inefficiency” and “cure” any 
“cost disease”.
There are also studies [10, 11] providing examples 
of empirical analysis of demand for cultural goods. At 
the same time, the works also cover the topic of goods 
in cultural heritage, but most works are devoted to 
the analysis of demand for performing arts products. 
Among the main hypotheses tested in the researches it 
is possible to think about the elasticity of demand for 
price, income, the price of possible substitutes, as well 
as the dependence of the current demand for cultural 
goods on the history of past cultural consumption.
In early works [3, 12, 13], proofs of various hypothesis 
about the elite status of the performing arts product 
consumers were confirmed 12. The analysis has been 
based on the study of the level of education, income 
and profession of these consumers. The paper [10, 12] 
has provided a summary table of more than thirty stud-
ies, among which [14–21] can be marked. The table has 
presented the results of testing the hypothesis that high 
elasticity demand for performing arts and such goods in 
general are luxury products. This hypothesis has been 
confirmed by only 4 studies out of total number, while in 
other 5 experiments mixed results have been obtained. 
Therefore, the demand was elastic only for certain types 
of viewers, organizations and events. It is important to 
note that most of the works have used aggregated data.
In some publications the authors have used more 
detailed data: [22] consumers have been divided by 
income level; [23] demand has been divided by types 
depending on the seats in the theatre’s auditorium; 
[18, 24] consumers have been divided into two groups 
depending on whether they purchased a season ticket 
or not. The approach to this problem should also be 
noted. Due to it, the analysis of the cross elasticity of 
demand for performing arts has been carried out [25].
In the abovementioned works, the authors have 
managed to empirically prove only some hypotheses 
that they put forward in relation to the demand for 
performing arts services. Among them are:
•  performing arts products are not necessarily 
perceived as a luxury product [26];
•  demand for performing arts services has mostly 
low elasticity at its own cost and a positive coefficient 
of cross elasticity at the price of some goods.
However, it should be noted that there are still open 
questions concerning the verification and interpreta-
tion of low price elasticity of demand, elasticity of 
income. It is also necessary to find out what goods 
can be considered as substitutes or complementary 
in relation to performing arts products, as well as the 
relationship between the standard socio-economic 
factors that determine demand, and social character-
istics such as, for example, “style” and specificity of 
consumer life.
ChaRaCtERIStICS Of thE RESEaRCh
The conditions of the current decline in the Russian 
economic growth create an opportunity to study this 
1 Ford Foundation. The Finances of the Performing Arts. Vol. 
II: A Survey of the Characteristics and Attitudes of Audiences 
for Theater, Opera, Symphony, and Ballet in 12 US Cities. Ford 
Foundation. New York. 1974.
2 National Research Center of the Arts. Inc. Americans and 
the Arts: A Survey of the Attitude toward and Participation in 
the Arts and Culture of the United States Public. National Re-
search Center of the Arts. Inc. New York. 1976.
БЮДЖЕТНАЯ СТРАТЕГИЯ / bUDGEt StRatEGY
FINANCETP.FA.Ru 27
effect. In this regard, according to the authors of this 
research, it is relevant to analyze the impact of the 
price level when visiting cultural institutions on the 
demand for these goods. At the same time, the authors 
have used A. Ya. Rubinshteyn’s idea, presented in work 
“Patronized goods in culture: features and consequences 
of cost disease” [6]. The objective of the work, according 
to the authors, is the confirmation or refutation of the 
early hypotheses of existing lagging labor productiv-
ity in one of the types of performing arts, namely in 
theaters. This requires a special approach to financing 
of this economic sector. The study period from 2001 to 
2014 allows for testing in the context of a single course 
of reform in the humanitarian sector in the country.
Considering the need for a special database, the 
information database of the Ministry of Culture of the 
Russian Federation has been selected as a major source. 
Some regional indicators have also been taken from 
the statistical base of Russian Federal State Statistics 
Service. The study includes annual data on all state 
theaters and the economy of the country as a whole, 
that combine values of the following indicators:
•  gross regional product (GRP);
•  income from events in theatres;
•  consumer price index (CPI);
•  number of employees in the economy as a whole;
•  number of visitors;
•  number of budget allocations;
•  theatre’s expenditures;
•  average wage of employees in theatres;
•  average number of employees in theatres;
•  average wages in the economy.
All initial financial indicators for each period have 
been used in current prices. To smooth the effect of 
price growth, which was 4.8 times for the period under 
review according to the Russian Federal State Statistics 
Service, the values have been adjusted to the prices of 
2001 by using the GDP deflator. At the same time, the 
entire data has been presented both in the regional 
context and in the context of Federal districts and 
Russia as a whole. At the end of 2014, 24 theaters were 
under the Federal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture 
of the Russian Federation and 593 under local juris-
diction, distributed among 80 subjects of the country.
PRIMaRY Data aNalYSIS
In this research a well-known Baumol’s indices have 
been used [6]:
Baumol’s Index “ 1B ”:
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where IV  and EV  —  labor productivity indicators, 
respectively, in the sphere of patronized goods and 
the economy as a whole, in years t  and 1t + .
Similar calculations have been used for index “ 2B ”, 
that characterizes the catch-up in wage dynamics, and 
index “ 3B ”, which illustrates the outrunning growth 
of ticket prices in relation to the relevant parameters 
of macroeconomic dynamics, general Baumol’s index 
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Fig. 1. Dynamics of labor productivity in theaters and in the economy of the Russian federation (2001=100%)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
N. A. Burakov, O. A. Slavinskaya
ФИНАНСЫ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА / FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE   Т. 22,  № 6’201828
“B ”, which measures the growth rate (by the base year) 
of the income deficit per visit, and its modification 
*“B ” —  which reflects the dynamics of changes in the 
share of expenses, covered by budget subsidies. In this 
regard, the following table should be considered (Fig. 1).
The table shows that the dynamics of labor produc-
tivity in theaters in 2001–2004 had a downward trend. 
After that, until 2010 it remained approximately at the 
same level, and only by 2014 it reached the same level 
as in 2001. At the same time, the level of productivity 
in the country has steadily increased, and changed the 
vector of its development only in 2009. This allows us 
to talk about the growth of 1.5 times relative to the 
base year by the end of 2014.
The data reveal a continuously widening gap be-
tween labor productivity in theatres and in the whole 
economy of the country. This confirms the hypothesis 
of “lagging labor productivity” of performing arts, 
formulated by Baumol and Bowen, and confirmed 
for Russia in the mentioned work of Rubinshteyn. A 
slight increase in 2012–2014 can be caused by the 
“May decrees” implemented by the President in 2012 
and the “Year of culture” announced in 2014. How-
ever, the measures taken to strengthen the cultural 
economy are clearly insufficient, as evidenced by 
the steadily increasing gap in productivity in recent 
years (Fig. 2).
In this case, index “ 1B ” —  is the dynamics of the 
ratio of labor productivity in theaters to labor produc-
tivity in the economy calculated in constant prices in 
2001 mainly to avoid the inflation on the analysis result. 
As shown in the picture (Fig. 2), despite some growth 
of this index since 2008, the line has a negative slope. 
It indicates the increase in the labor productivity lag 
in theaters from the economy as a whole.
Next is the value of index “ 2B ”, which reflects the 
dynamics of the ratio of average monthly wages in 
theaters to the average monthly wage in the economy. 
This confirms the hypothesis about independence of 
wage growth in theaters from labor productivity growth. 
It has been shown as a positive slope (Fig. 3).
The table allows shows the catch up dynamics 
of wage growth in theaters. If index “ 2B ” is consid-
ered in the context of the federation subjects, the 
situation doesn’t look so clear. Thus, in the Ural FD 
wages in theaters in 2001 were significantly lower 
than in average in the economy of the federal district 
where index “ 2B ” was 0.39. Despite obvious prob-
lems in financing theatre activities in this region, 
in 2014 the value of this index increased to 0.71. In 
the North-Western Federal district it was almost 
1.36, i. e. the wage in theatres was higher than the 
average wage in this district by one third (Fig. 4). In 
general, the hypothesis on the wage growth in this 
sphere of economic can be accepted in isolation from 
productivity growth.
The dynamics of index “ 3B ” should be considered 
as it reflects the ratio of tickets prices in theaters with 
the overall level of prices in the economy (Fig. 5).
As seen from the table, the values of index “ 3B ” in 
the period under review were steadily rising. At the 
same time, in 2008–2010 and 2013–2014, there was 
a decrease in the index. The maximum value was re-
corded in 2013 at the level of 2.89 comparing to 2001. 
However, in 2014, index “ 3B ” was 2.68. It follows that 
the theatre ticket prices were growing faster than CPI. 
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Fig. 2. Dynamics of index “ 1B ” (in constant prices of 2001, 2001=1)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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This regularity for the period from 2001 to 2014 co-
incides with the result Rubinshteyn’s publication [6].
The change of the Baumol’s index “B ” should also 
be considered, as it measures the theatre income deficit 
per one visitor (Fig. 6).
The table shows that the income deficit has in-
creased since 2001 over the considered period. There-
fore, the result of the impact of the cost disease, namely, 
the inability to cover costs from own income is seen. 
It is particularly important to follow the dynamics of 
another indicator —  “ *B ”, which measures the share 
of expenditure covered by the budget allocations. The 
dynamics of this index is shown in the following table 
(Fig. 7).
Based on the graphical analysis, a certain increase 
can be mentioned in indicator “B* ”; the values of this 
index range from 1 to 1.25. In this period, theaters need-
ed support to cover their own costs. To understand what 
costs theaters were able to cover themselves due to ticket 
sales, it makes sense to consider another schedule (Fig. 8).
The results show that the share of expenses, cov-
ered by the income from their own activities, de-
creased over the considered period, with the maxi-
mum value of 0.24 it reached in 2001. It is possible 
Fig. 3. Dynamics oindex “
2B ” (in constant prices of 2001, 2001=1)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
Fig. 4. Dynamics of index “ 2B ” in the NWfD, UfD and in Russia (in constant 2001 prices, 2001=1)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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Fig. 5. Dynamics of index “ 3B ” (in constant prices of 2001, 2001=1)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
Fig. 6. Dynamics of index “ B ” (in constant prices of 2001, 2001=1)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
Fig. 7. Dynamics of index “ *B ” (2001=1)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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to note a small increase from 2006 to 2010, but the 
value itself increased slightly from 0.18 to 0.20. On 
the contrary, the share of budget funds in covering 
costs increased from 0.64 to 0.74. Although, there 
was a decrease in this indicator from 2008 to 2011, 
its value always remained more than 0.60. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that almost 70% of all expenses 
were covered only by the budget allocations. Theat-
ers were able to cover about 20% of costs due to the 
tickets sales, and the remaining 10% were covered by 
commercial activities.
ECONOMEtRIC MODElING
As mentioned above, the research presents the data for 
the period of 2001–2014 in Russia and the regions of 
the Russian Federation. It makes it possible to evalu-
ate the status of these types of culture and to check 
cost disease in relation to the current stage of their 
development.
To begin with, the table of initial statistics of the 
calculated indicators should be analyzed (Tabl. 1). 
First of all, Jarque-Bera statistics has been used, the 
null hypothesis of which is that the data is normally 
distributed. Since the probability value for all vari-
ables is 0, it can be concluded that the analyzed data 
is not normally distributed. This is also confirmed by 
the values of the coefficients of kurtosis and skew-
ness, which are 3 and 0, respectively, in the normal 
distribution. The calculations show that in this case 
the values of the analyzed indicators differ from the 
normal values.
Now, the available data for stationary should be 
check. For this, the test for panel data Levin, Lin & 
Chu has been used where the null hypothesis indicates 
a unit root. The obtained probability values indicate 
that the null hypothesis has been rejected, therefore, 
all data are stationary (Tabl. 2).
The econometric model of the dependence of the 
income deficit on the calculated values of the Baumol’s 
indices follows. This analysis will be carried out by 
using three main models.
1. The pooled model of panel data.
The choice of this method is due directly to the 
structure of statistical data, namely the values of the 
Baumol’s coefficients for 80 regions of the Russian 
Federation for the period of 2001–2014. The equation 
of the model is as follows:
 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 ,it it it it itB B B B= β +β +β +β + ε        (2)
where itB — is the value of income deficit in the i-th 
region, 0β  —  is a constant coefficient, 1B ; 2B ; 2B  — 
are the coefficients of the regression model; itB  — is 
the value of Baumol’s indexes “ 1B ”, “ 2B ”, “ 3B ” in the 
i-th region. Errors itε   — are normal and mutually in-
dependent. Model estimates have been obtained by 
the least squares method (OLS).
The modification of the basic model is also cal-
culated. Instead of “B ”, the value of income deficit, 
indicator “ *B ” is used — it characterizes the share of 
expenses covered by the budget subsidies. The modi-
fied model is as follows:
Fig. 8. Share of expenses covered by ticket sales (%)
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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          * 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 ,it it it it itB B B B= β +β +β +β + ε       (3)
where * —itB is the share of expenses is covered by 
the budget subsidies in the i-th region, 0β  — is a con-
stant coefficient, kitB  — is the value of Baumol’s in-
dexes “ 1B ”, “ 2B ”, “ 3B ” in the i-th region.
2. The model of quantile regression.
The quantile regression is the process of estimat-
ing the parameters of linear dependence between 
explanatory variables and the specified quantile 
level of the explained variable. Unlike the usual OLS, 
quantile regression is a kind of a nonparametric esti-
mation method. It gives the opportunity to get more 
information: to estimate the regression parameters 
for all quantiles of the distribution of the dependent 
variable. In addition, the model is significantly less 
sensitive to emissions in statistics and to violations 
of assumptions about the nature of distributions.
This approach eliminates the bias in the estima-
tion results due to anomalous emissions that influ-
ence the average value of total Baumol’s index char-
acterizing the consequences of the cost disease. In 
Table 1
Summary statistics of indicators
b b 1 b 2 b 3 b*
Mean 1.922447 0.767922 1.169605 0.895463 1.065583
Median 1.601830 0.743097 1.113832 0.822634 1.036792
Maximum 15.57550 10.65582 2.665374 5.366528 6.505754
Minimum 0.209104 0.103547 0.489517 0.150577 0.038214
Std, Dev, 1.385603 0.389758 0.272180 0.480304 0.298152
Skewness 5.417054 15.24755 1.488635 3.850281 10.63878
Kurtosis 45.54463 381.4124 7.016783 27.79213 169.1881
Jarque-Bera 87778.08 6563734. 1138.482 30692.72 1278409.
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Sum 2101.234 839.3384 1278.378 978.7408 1164.682
Sum Sq. Dev. 2096.527 165.8875 80.89777 251.9154 97.07314
Observations 1093 1093 1093 1093 1093
Source: the calculations done by the author.
Table 2
test levin, lin & Chu
the null hypothesis of a unit root by
levin, lin & Chu test
Original data the logarithms of the data
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob.
B –11.1978 0.0000 –15.0479 0.0000
B 1 –20.4508 0.0000 –13.7904 0.0000
B 2 –6.10965 0.0000 –9.10863 0.0000
B 3 –7.08662 0.0000 –2.84503 0.0022
B* –15.6797 0.0000 –15.5254 0.0000
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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the research, the model of the quantile regression 
has been presented in the following way:
 
( )1 2 3
0 1 1 2 2 3 3
| , ,
, 0.5,
it
it it itB
it it it
Q B B B
B B B
τ =
= β +β +β +β τ =  (4)
where τ  — is the quantile level and takes values in 
between ( )0;1 . If 0.5τ = , then, the model turns into 
a median (conditional median) regression. If to calcu-
late the equation modification replacing the depend-
ent variable by indicator “ *B . ”, the share of expenses 
covered by budget subsidies, the quantile regression 
will look as follows:
 
( )* 1 2 3
0 1 1 2 2 3 3
| , ,
, 0.5.
it
it it itB
it it it
Q B B B
B B B
τ =
= β +β +β +β τ =  (5)
3. The quantile regression model with logarithm data.
Considering that the original data are not distrib-
uted normally, logarithms of the data have been cal-
culated for further study and the following quantile 
regressions have been constructed:
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Before moving to the construction of econometric 
models, it is necessary to consider the correlation ta-
ble and determine the impact of Baumol’s indices on 
the income deficit and the share of costs covered by 
subsidies (Tabl. 3).
The calculations have showed that for index “B ” 
value, the correlation coefficients with the explanatory 
variables fluctuate modulo from 0.13 to 0.32. Variable “
1B ” coefficient is negative, which suggests that with the 
lag of labor productivity in culture from the economy, 
Table 3
 Pair correlation
b b1 b2 b3 b*
B 1.000000 –0.215717 0.130045 0.323569 –0.110817
B1 –0.215717 1.000000 0.087084 –0.077716 –0.079612
B2 0.130045 0.087084 1.000000 –0.134132 0.037090
B3 0.323569 –0.077716 –0.134132 1.000000 0.028464
B* –0.110817 –0.079612 0.037090 0.028464 1.000000
Source: the calculations done by the author.
Table 4
the coefficients of models № 1
Dependent 
variable «b»
Explanatory variables
Const b 1 b 2 b 3 R
 2 Number of 
observations
OLS 0.478 (0.204)**
–0.734
(0.098)***
0.981 
(0.142)***
0.962 (0.080)*** 0.18 1093
Quantile 1.370 (0.220)***
–1.645
(0.192)***
0.858 
(0.126)***
0.417 (0.142)*** 0.05 1093
Quantile with 
logarithms
0.150 (0.023)***
–0.818
(0.039)***
0.733 
(0.070)***
0.153 (0.032)*** 0.26 1093
“***” ,“**”, “*” —  meaning of the regression coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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the income deficit will increase. For indicator “ *B ”, 
the coefficients vary from 0.028 to 0.079, while the 
ratio of signs at the coefficients is similar to index “B ”. 
The direct results of evaluation of all three models are 
presented below (Tabl. 4).
Due to the received results, it can be said that for 
different model evaluation options, all coefficients for 
explanatory variables are significant at 1% level. It is 
important to note that the coefficient for variable “ 1B ”, 
which reflects the relationship between productivity in 
theaters and productivity in the economy, is negative 
in all models. This suggests that with the lag in labor 
productivity, the income deficit in theaters will only 
increase. The coefficients for “ 2B ” and “ 3B ” are posi-
tive in all models. This indicates an increasing deficit 
with above-average growth of wages and ticket prices. 
Based on this, it can be concluded that the increase 
in ticket prices does not reduce the income deficit in 
theaters. Below are the results of the evaluation of the 
modified model (Tabl. 5).
For variable “ *B ” the results are slightly different. 
When evaluating the model by the OLS method, it has 
been found out that only indicator “ 1B ” is negative. 
At 1% v has significant impact on the share of costs 
covered by subsidies, while “ 2B ” and “ 3B ” are insig-
nificant. However, in case of quantile regression, the 
coefficients are all significant, with all variables being 
significant at 1% level and “ 3B ” at 10% level. After the 
logarithms model has been introduced, it the improve-
ment in the value of coefficient “ 3B ” can be noted. It 
is now significant at 5% level. Considering that the 
original data are not normal, with the introduction 
of the quantile regression (median) and logarithms, 
smoothing of the data takes place. This leads to an 
increase in the significance of the coefficients. At the 
same time, the regularities, typical for “B ”, are used 
for “ *B ”. With the lag in labor productivity, advanced 
wage growth and super-inflationary growth of ticket 
prices, share of costs, covered by budget subsidies, 
will increase.
The results ofhe evaluation of these two models 
show that if the current trends continue, thso“
1B ”, 
the growth of “ 2B ” and “ 3B ”, the income deficit will 
increase. Thus, the costs will exceed the revenues from 
its own activities, which will result in the fact, that 
the costs of theaters will be covered only by budget 
subsidies (the growth of “ *B ”). This regularity has 
been completely confirmed by all three constructed 
econometric models.
The highest coefficient of determination is ob-
served in the 3rd model, i. e. in the quantile regression 
for logarithm data. However, the value of coefficient
2 0.26R =  for “B ” and 2 0.06R = for “ *B ”, which is 
not high enough.
To evaluate the effect of price changes and other 
parameters on the income deficit value, the values of 
the average elasticity coefficients have been calculated. 
The estimates received by means of the following for-
mula have been considered:
       
, 1,2,3,
i
B i
B i
B
E i
B
= β × =   (8)
where 
i
B
BE  —  is the average elasticity coefficient 
value of income deficit “B ” of the Baumol’s 
coefficients, iβ  —  is the regression coefficient value 
at iB , iB  —  is the average value of the Baumol’s 
coefficients, B  —  is the average value of income 
deficit. Elasticity has been calculated for “ *B ” in the 
same way. The analysis of the results is presented in 
Tabl. 6.
Table 5
the coefficients of models № 2
Dependent variable 
“b*”
Explanatory variables
Const b 1 b 2 b 3 R
 2 Number of 
observations
OLS 1.036 (0.048)***
–0.062
(0.023)***
0.053 (0.033)
0.018 
(0.019)
0.009 1093
Quantile 0.949 (0.035)***
–0.090
(0.025)***
0.112 
(0.017)***
0.029 
(0.015)*
0.05 1093
Quantile with 
logarithms
0.000
(004)
–0.073
(0.014)***
0.142 
(0.018)***
0.031 
(0.012)**
0.06 1093
**”,“**”,“*” —eaning of the regression coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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The result received allow to see the negative elastic-
ity of income deficit of Baumol’s index “ 1B ” and the 
positive elasticity of the Baumol’s indices “ 2B ” and 
“ 3B ”. The same sign ratio is maintained for modified 
Baumol index “ *B ”. It is important to note, that the 
modulus of all coefficients is less than 1, therefore, 
elasticity is relatively weak. Thus, the deficit or share 
of costs, covered by subsidies, causes poor reaction to 
the changes in any of Baumol’s indices and changes 
insignificantly.
INStItUtIONS Of CUltURE fINaNCING
If to mention the current economic situation 
of culture in Russia, it should be noted that the 
economic system development constantly faces 
serious difficulties. They consist in reduced 
growth rates of national production, weakening of 
the national currency, problems of the deficit of 
budget system. Such trends, in many ways, create 
an unfavorable situation for culture. As shown 
in the previous section, this situation is subject 
to the phenomenon of cost disease. Taking into 
account the nominal reduction of Federal budget 
expenditures on culture by more than 16.5% until 
2020 (in relation to expenditures in 2017), and the 
practice of limited budget financing of cultural 
organizations in the regions developed in recent 
years, it is necessary to pay attention to the system 
of distribution of funds.
It is obvious that the growing needs of cultural 
institutions in the budget allocations, subject to the 
declining funding of culture, can’t be fully met. Due 
to the growing shortage of income, there is a need to 
find additional resources to finance cultural organi-
zations. To find the best way to financially support 
organizations, the formation of institutions of public 
support for organizations can become an actual direc-
tion in the development of this sector of the economy.
In international experience, lack of public funding 
is often compensated by increasing public support and 
creating new forms of interaction between citizens 
and cultural organizations in need of additional in-
come or reducing costs. The “bottlenecks” of public 
administration in financial support of culture can be 
eliminated with the help of institutions of civil activity, 
able to adjust the decisions of local authorities. Also, 
by ordinary citizens participation in the selection of 
priority areas of development.
The first group of the institutes consists mainly of 
charity institutes existing both abroad and in Russia. 
Within this group 2 main groups of institutions can 
be distinguished:
1) institutions that save financial expenses of cul-
tural institutions, as well as institutions that attract 
additional financial resources: institute of volunteer-
ing, crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, patronage of arts, 
NPO and various funds.
2) institutions of civil activity in the redistribution 
of public finances: institute of proactive budgeting, 
institute of individual budget allocations.
The first group of institutions is based on the prin-
ciple of impact on culture organizations by increasing 
or saving their resources. It is important for improving 
the financial situation of art institutions. However, 
these mechanisms imply additional (including fi-
nancial) burden on citizens. Therefore, in a difficult 
economic situation in the country, institutions of 
different content become particularly important.
It should be kept in mind that the main task is 
the distribution of the resources already collected by 
Table 6
the value of the average coefficient of elasticity
OlS Quantile
 
1β
 
2β
 
3β
 
1β
 
2β
 
3β
 β
–0.29338 0.596834 0.448093 –0.6571 0.593792 0.208675
 *β –0.04468 0.058174 0.015126 –0.06486 0.122933 0.02437
Source: the calculations done by the author.
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the state. In particular, the budget of any size can be 
directed to social needs, and on the contrary, to other 
areas of the function of state and society.
In this regard, a particularly notable topic for study 
is institutions that allow citizens to independently 
participate in the distribution of budgetary funds, 
despite their small amounts.
One such institution for redistributing resources, 
which allows managing funds at the municipal level, 
is the institution of proactive budgeting. It has recently 
become very popular. This institution is a mechanism 
of budget redistribution. It allows citizens who do 
not participate in political processes and election 
campaigns to vote how to spend budget.
This initiative was first launched in Latin America 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and since then has 
gained popularity in North America, Europe and a 
number of Asian countries. The features of successful 
implementation of such institutions are: political will 
and sufficient material support of the state, developed 
civil society and support from local governments.
In modern practice of the Russian Federation, this 
institution was initially presented by the “Support 
program for local initiatives” (SPLI), provided by the 
World Bank in 2007. Back then, the program started 
in the eastern regions of the Stavropol region. Today, 
the development and implementation of this institu-
tion is supported by a joint project of the Ministry 
of Finance of the Russian Federation and the World 
Bank in the framework of program of improving ef-
ficient management of public and municipal finances 
for the period up to 2018 “Ensuring openness and 
transparency of public finances” (approved in 2013). It 
involves joint financing of the most popular projects at 
the municipal level, both by citizens and by the state.
Another public institution of budget redistribution 
is the institute of individual budget allocations (IBA).
IBA, as well as the institute of proactive budg-
eting, contains the mechanism of redistribution of 
budgetary funds. However, if the previous institution 
performs additional project work at the municipal 
level, the IBA should become a direct add-on to the 
existing tax system. According to the preferences of 
every citizen, this mechanism provides them with a 
choice of priority expenditures of a small part of the 
budget in the range of 2%, paid personal income tax.
The main distinguishing feature of this institute 
is the decision to finance certain areas, including 
culture. It covers the territory of the whole country. 
At the same time, this possibility must be enshrined 
in law in such a way that the chosen decision was final 
and there would be no possibility for the authorities 
to review it.
The institute of individual budget allocations 
provides citizens with the right to vote for ways of 
spending a limited part of the state’s tax revenues. 
The development of the Institute of “interest phi-
lanthropy” is peculiar to European countries. The 
basis of the “interest philanthropy” model was the 
Western European practice of Italy and Spain, where 
income tax deductions were mainly used for financial 
support of the Catholic Church and to a far lesser 
degree for other social and cultural needs. However, 
in Hungary, in the mid-1990s, a new format of the 
existing institution was proposed, considering the 
current socio-economic situation in the country and 
the level of philanthropy. After the so-called “1% law” 
was implemented in December, 1996, individuals 
were given the right to direct 1% of the income tax, 
paid in the last tax period, to the selected budget 
organization or non-profit organization, including 
those of culture. Non-profit organizations in Hungary, 
inspired by the new opportunities offered by the law, 
conducted a mass campaign among the population to 
report on their activities, thus, creating an extensive 
base of recipients.
CONClUSION
The research leads to a few important conclusions. 
First, the lag in productivity in theaters from the 
economy as a whole stays on new data and on a new 
time interval. As for wages, there is an increase in 
coefficient “ 2B ”, that is a reduction in the gap be-
tween wages in theaters and the economy as a whole. 
Primarily due to the “May decrees” introduced by the 
President of the Russian Federation in 2012, the gap 
reduction is not observed in all Federal districts. At the 
same time, there is a strong regional differentiation 
in the value of coefficient “ 2B ” —  not in all regions 
the wage in theaters has reached the regional level 
and can be only half of its level.
Second, the econometric analysis has confirmed 
the results of the work [6] in the nature of Baumol’s 
coefficients’ influence on the income deficit value. 
Although the models were based on the latest, more 
extensive data, during the period when the coun-
try was experiencing economic recovery and GDP 
growth, the research has still resulted in lagging la-
bor productivity in theaters from the national level 
in the economy, contributing to the deficit increase. 
Strengthening wage growth in theatres and infla-
tionary ticket price increases effect positively on the 
deficit increase.
Third, the impact of Baumol’s coefficients on such 
an indicator as share of expenditures covered by budg-
etary subsidies has been considered. For this modified 
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indicator the se regularities, as for the level of income 
deficit, remain. Their relationship can be mentioned. If 
the lagging productivity, wage growth and ticket prices 
rise contribute to the deficit growth and reduce their 
income from direct activities, then, theaters will be able 
to cover their costs only by direct government support. 
Therefore, the share of expenses covered by subsidies will 
increase. This has been observed in the course of work.
The fourth, this research has confirmed the hy-
pothesis of slightly positive elasticity of demand for 
ticket prices. Thus, the growth of ticket prices is not 
a means to reduce specific revenue deficit.
Consequently, it can be concluded that theaters 
have still been subject to the cost disease. They ne
ed direct state subsidies. At the same time, consider-
ing this feature, “competent” cultural policy should be 
developed and implemented. It is important to note, that 
today budget subsidies are not the only way to support 
theaters and other cultural institutions. It is necessary 
to develop the existing institutions and introduce new 
alternative institutions of support from civil society, 
which are successfully used in many countries [27]. Such 
institutions can be divided into 2 groups.
The first group includes institutions of charity 
that exist both abroad and in Russia. In this group, 
institutes that economize of financial expenses of 
cultural institutions can be identified:
•  institute of volunteerism,
•  crowdsourcing,
and also, institutions of attracting additional fi-
nancial resources for cultural institutions:
•  crowdfunding,
•  patronage of arts,
•  NPO and various foundations.
The second group is a mechanism of interaction 
between the state and the society while selecting 
priority areas of budget financing:
•  institute of proactive budgeting,
•  institute of individual budget allocations (IBA).
These institutions are fundamentally new for the 
Russian practice of self-government. It is necessary 
to activate civil society and significant state support 
for their creation and functioning. Based on the 
experience of using these institutions in different 
countries, the second group has a strong potential 
for financial support to cultural institutions. The 
combination of all the above-mentioned institu-
tions with the ward of the state will contribute to 
sufficient funding and sustainable development of 
the economics of culture.
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